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INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND 
COLLECTIVE CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY:  
DO THEY REINFORCE OR CONTRADICT  
ONE ANOTHER? 
THOMAS FRANCK∗ 
Article IX of the Genocide Convention1 provides: 
Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the 
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, 
including those relating to the responsibility of a state for genocide 
or for any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be 
submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any 
of the parties to the dispute. 
Disputes . . . relating to the responsibility of a state for 
genocide . . . shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the 
request of any of the parties to the dispute. This provision of the Genocide 
Convention, inspired by the Nuremberg trials, was one of the great 
innovations of the early years following World War II. But laws evolve, 
and the Genocide Convention is almost fifty-five years old. Much has 
happened. Genocide, once thought to have been banished forever from the 
human capacity for evil, has reasserted itself as a deliberately chosen 
instrument for the conduct of politics: in Rwanda, Croatia, Bosnia and, 
probably, Dafur. 
It can be argued that the responsibility of states that commit genocide 
has been mitigated by events that have occurred since the Genocide 
Convention entered into force. Chief among these is the momentous 
development of a criminal jurisdiction for the punishment of certain 
international crimes, including genocide. Now that we have the 
International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and 
ICTR), and the International Criminal Court (ICC), each with an extensive 
investigatory and prosecutorial capability, is it really still useful and 
necessary for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to play its 
determinative role under Article IX of the Genocide Convention? 
 
 
 ∗ Murray and Ida Becker Professor of Law Emeritus, New York University School of Law. 
 1. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 9, Jan. 12, 1951, 
78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
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This very question was raised by two judges of the ICJ in 1996, during 
the preliminary objections phase of the Genocide Case brought by Bosnia 
against the former Yugosloavia, in which I acted as counsel for Bosnia. 
Permit me to share with you some of the observations I made to the Court 
last April. Since the pleadings have closed, but the Court has yet to render 
its opinion, it should not be amiss for me to place these views before you 
as an issue of law far transcending the merits of the case in which they 
were raised. 
In a Joint Declaration appended to an earlier, that is, 1996, decision of 
the Court pertaining to its jurisdiction in the Genocide Case, Judges Shi 
and Vereschchetin discussed the creation and mandates of the ad hoc 
ICTY and the ICC, and the bearing of those developments on this case. 
They said, in part: 
The determination of the international community to bring 
individual perpetrators of genocidal acts to justice, irrespective of 
their ethnicity or the position they occupy, points to the most 
appropriate course of action. . . . Therefore, in our view, it might be 
argued that this Court is perhaps not the proper venue for the 
adjudication of the complaints which the applicant has raised. . . .2  
As to why their Court may no longer be the proper venue, the two 
judges cited a then-recent article by Britain’s Chief Prosecutor at the 
Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, Sir Hartley Shawcross. They quoted 
approvingly his recent opinion that: “There can be no reconciliation unless 
individual guilt for the appalling crimes of the last few years replaces the 
pernicious theory of collective guilt on which so much racial hatred 
hangs.”3 
Does the ICJ, in discharging its responsibility under Article IX to 
establish the “responsibility” of a state for genocide, risk trenching on the 
jurisdiction now assigned to the ICTY and ICC? And does it risk 
perpetuating a notion of “collective guilt”? 
First, as to the matter of duplication of functions. Quite clearly, the 
drafters of the Genocide Convention intended to provide both for 
punishment of individuals who participate in a genocidal enterprise and 
for the responsibility of states which put the machinery and resources of 
the nation at the disposal of such an enterprise. Articles IV, V and VI of 
 
 
 2. Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 632 (July 11) (Joint 
Declaration of Judges Shi and Vereschetin) (emphasis in original). 
 3. Hartley Shawcross, Let the Tribunal do its Job, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1996, at A17. 
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the Convention establish the modalities for punishing individual 
perpetrators, while Article IX concurrently establishes the means by which 
the ICJ will attribute state responsibility. Evidently, the drafters saw the 
two remedies as distinct, unduplicative and both necessary to an effective 
regime for ridding the world of the scourge of genocide. 
The creation of an international criminal process for addressing 
individual criminal responsibility in no way alters the importance of the 
ICJ’s playing its assigned role in addressing state responsibility for 
genocide. It merely realizes the development forseen by the Convention in 
Article VI, which envisions the creation of “an international penal 
tribunal” for the trial of “persons” as an alternative to such persons’ trial 
“by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was 
committed[.]”4 If anything, the Convention expected the jurisdiction of 
national criminal courts to be supplemented or replaced by international 
criminal tribunals when it came to the trial of individuals, but certainly it 
envisioned no comparable effect on the jurisdiction, or the importance, of 
this Court in making determinations of state responsibility. 
Is such state responsibility tantamount to a determination of “collective 
guilt”? It is undisputable that, to blame an entire people, the population of 
the state, for the acts of the state would be to assert a discredited notion of 
“collective guilt.” We all celebrate the emergence of a human rights 
regime that recognizes the rights of the individual as distinct from, and 
sometimes even in opposition to, those of the state. We recognize and 
celebrate the emergence of a parallel system of personal legal 
accountability. And we should, therefore, agree that, in this modern age of 
individual rights and duties, it is untenable to blame an entire polis–the 
whole citizenry–for the wrongs committed either by individual criminals 
or by a criminal government. 
Obviously, it would be unconscionable to resuscitate the hoary notions 
of collective guilt, the guilt of all Serbs or all Rwandan Hutus. Collective 
guilt is the discredited detritus of an age when individuals were legally 
indistinguishable from, and mere serfs of, their ruler: the king or state. 
But, just as obviously, even in the new era of individual rights and 
responsibilities, the state has not ceased to exist. It is, and it acts, and it 
must be held accountable. When the state commits a great evil, it cannot 
be allowed to escape responsibility by the punishment of a few leaders. As 
pointed out in Oppenheim, acts committed by individuals as agents of the 
state constitute quite separate wrongs of the principal and the agent. Those 
 
 
 4. Supra note 1, art. 6. 
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acts are directly, and not merely vicariously attributable to the state which 
authorized, permitted, or failed to take reasonable measures to prevent or 
punish those acts.5 These “preventive and remedial obligations of the 
state . . . are themselves obligations for the breach of which . . . the state 
bears direct responsibility.”6  
In this way modern international law distinguishes between the 
criminal acts of a person—whether prime minister, field commander, 
prison capo, or leader of a private militia—and the failure of a state to live 
up to its solemn legal obligations to other states. Although claims in both 
circumstances may proceed from the same facts, they involve the breach 
of quite separate obligations. And there must be separate remedies for both 
kinds of wrongs. 
Thus, in holding a state accountable under Article IX of the 
Convention, there can be no question of collective guilt, and none, either, 
of double jeopardy in the law that is meant to constrain genocide. 
Behind these somewhat technical legal issues, however, there is a 
larger moral question: Is it fair that the entire state be held accountable for 
the actions initiated by its leaders and executed by its organs? 
If Article IX were to be applied by the ICJ against a state, would such a 
finding of state responsibility not be likely to impose an unfair burden on 
all its citizens, regardless of whether they did, or did not, support or 
tolerate the acts of the regime that had violated to prohibition against 
genocide?  
 In response, it is once more necessary to emphasize that a finding of 
state responsibility is not tantamount to a determination of the people’s 
collective guilt. Clearly, there were Serbs, as also there were Hutus, who 
understood the enormity of what was being done in their name, and who 
opposed the regime’s genocidal actions. But, as Professor Michael Walzer, 
the eminent Princeton philosopher, has pointed out, even though “it cannot 
be said that every citizen is the author of every state policy,” nevertheless, 
“every one of them can rightly be called to account.” He explains that,  
citizenship is common destiny, and no one, not even [the regime’s] 
opponents . . . can escape the effect of a bad regime, an ambitious or 
fanatic leadership, or an overreaching nationalism. But if men and 
women must accept this destiny, they can sometimes do so with a 
good conscience, for the acceptance says nothing about their 
 
 
 5. LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 501–02 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir 
Arthur Watts eds., 1992) (1905). 
 6. Id. at 502. 
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p 567 Franck book pages.doc10/29/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY 571 
 
 
 
 
individual responsibility. The distribution of costs is not the 
distribution of guilt.7  
The distribution of costs, not the distribution of guilt, is what Article IX 
is about. It is both fair and right that the citizenry of every state that visits 
serious injury on a people should have to bear at least significant parts of 
the cost of compensating and restituting the victims. 
That act of sharing the burden of reconstituting the victim is, in itself, 
good enough reason not to abandon the concept of state responsibility for 
genocide merely because individuals may also be held accountable in 
another international tribunal. That sharing is an essential part of the 
healing process. 
There is, however, another reason why state responsibility must not be 
allowed to fall into desuetude. 
In the 1951 Reservations advisory opinion, the ICJ had observed that 
the Genocide Convention, more than any other treaty, had been “adopted 
for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose.” In other words, the 
Convention has a hortatory function. That “civilizing purpose” is to teach 
all persons, everywhere, that they cannot escape responsibility for 
egregious wrongs committed in their name. In this sense, the role of the 
ICJ in carrying out the function assigned it by the Genocide Convention is 
an essential part of the answer to some undesired side effects of the growth 
of individual criminal responsibility. These are described by Professor 
Mark Drumbl, who points out that “the deliberate choice by international 
criminal justice institutions to selectively blame a handful of individuals 
. . . erases . . . the involvement of ordinary [persons] . . . [and, thus] leads 
to a retributive shortfall, insofar as only a few people receive their just 
deserts, while many powerful states and organizations avoid 
accountability.”8  
State responsibility, in respect to genocide, speaks not of collective 
guilt but of the obligation of a state to share in remedying the 
consequences of its violation of international law. It summons the people 
of the victim state and the victimizer state to work together to ameliorate 
the damage done, to display a new determination to work together, to 
rebuild, to reconstitute. As the Permanent Court of International Justice 
said in the merits phase, Factory at Chorzow case:9 the essential principle 
 
 
 7. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 297 (Basic Books 1977).  
 8. Mark A. Drumbl, Sands: From Nuremberg to The Hague (book rev.), 103 MICH. L. REV. 
1295, 1314 (2005). 
 9. The Factory at Chorzon (Germany v. Poland) 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13). 
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contained in the actual notion of an illegal act—a principle which seems to 
be established by arbitral tribunals—is “that reparation must, as far as 
possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish 
the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had 
not been committed.”10 
It is a shared determination to “wipe-out all the consequences of the 
illegal act” that, alone, could usher in a new era in the places where 
genocide has occurred. Article IX can promote that determination.  
And then there is the future. In shaping it, the law can play several 
important “civilizing” roles. It can summon persons everywhere to display 
the courage to oppose criminal activities by their own governments. It can 
proclaim that a nation’s tolerance of, or complicity in, egregiously illegal 
conduct cannot be expiated by punishing a few notorious leaders. It can 
ensure that the burdens—and, under Article IX, they are civil, not 
criminal—of reconstituting that which was illegally destroyed is shared 
and does not come to rest exclusively on the victims. 
Important steps forward have been taken by the introduction of a 
functional notion of personal criminal responsibility, implemented by a 
legitimate international criminal judiciary. Those developments have 
encouraged us to hope that our generation has made significant progress 
out of the despondency of the past. To quote ICTY Judge Theodor Meron, 
speaking at Sarajevo as President of that tribunal,  
Those who drafted, on the heels of the Second World War and the 
Holocaust, the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, were animated by the desire to ensure that the 
horror of a state-organized deliberate and massive murder of a 
group of people purely because of their identity will never recur in 
the history of mankind.11  
What a terrible bargain it would turn out to be if personal criminal 
liability would have been achieved at the cost of state responsibility. And 
what a misunderstanding of the requisites of justice. 
In modern international law, the state no longer owns the individual; 
rather, the individuals collectively own the state. With the privilege of that 
new status, the people who constitute the modern state must willingly 
accept their share in state responsibility, not try to shirk it. When a state 
deliberately leads, helps, trains, arms, clothes, pays and inspires those who 
 
 
 10. Id. at 40. 
 11. Press Release, Address by ICTY President Theodor Meron, at Protucari Memorial Cemetary, 
U.N. Doc. CT/P.I.S./860-e (June 23, 2004). 
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do commit genocide, then, while the passive citizenry does not share the 
perpetrators’ guilt, it does share responsibility for the enormity of what 
was done in the citizenry’s name and the citizens’ responsibility to help 
make amends. Only thus can the law hope to end the recurring nightmare 
of recrimination and revenge that plagues the scenes of genocide.  
In sum: genocide is a hydra-headed monster. It warrants a multi-
faceted response. The heralded advent of individual liability should not 
cloud our understanding of the continued importance of state 
responsibility.
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